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RECENT DECISIONS

banking act provides for the method of distributing the assets of insolvent
national banks. Spradlin v. Royal Manufacturing Co., 73 F. (2d) 776 (C.C.A.
4th, 1934); Grindley v. First National Bank of Detroit, 87 F. (2d) 110 (C.C.A.
6th, 1936); see also, American Surety Company of New York v. Baldwin, 90 F.
(2d) 708. (C.C.A. 7th, 1937).
Officers of the United States, when discharging duties under federal authority pursuant to and by virtue of valid federal laws, are not subject to arrest
or other liability under the laws of the state in which their duties are being
performed. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 19 Sup. Ct. 453, 43 L.ed. 699 (1898).
A state court has no power to control by mandamus the official discretion of an
officer or agent of the United States and arrest and punish him for an act done
or omitted to be done in the performance of his duties. Ex Parte Shockley, 17 F.
(2d) 133, (D.C. Ohio, 1926). But the mere fact that a person is an officer or
agent of the United States charged with the performace of certain duties under
that government, will not afford him immunity from prosecution under the laws
of the state, if the acts complained of are such as to show that the claimed immunity is a mere subterfuge and that under no fair consideration of his official
duty could he have assumed he was acting in his official capacity. In re Waite,
81 Fed. 359 (D.C. Iowa, 1897).
It must be conceded that the States are without power to enforce any laws
or regulations which directly and materially interfere with the instrumentalities
of the Federal government. But on the other hand, the police power of a state
is not exceeded when the interference with a federal instrumentality is only
indirect or incidental. It is in the application of this "axiomatic" principle, however, where difficulties arise. This is true because the ascertainment by the
courts of what is a "direct" and "material" interference as contrasted with that
which is an "indirect" or "immaterial" interference is governed by the particular
facts and circumstances of each case.
Observing the great increase in the number and importance of federal
instrumentalities in recent years, the principal case is indicative of a possible
trend by the courts to construe liberally state laws as merely exercising an
indirect or immaterial interference with an instrumentality of the federal government and thus within the police power of the states.
JOHN H. RussELL.

Insurance-What Constitutes An Insurance Business?-Proceeding in quo
warranto to oust the defendant from the insurance business with the state of
Ohio. The defendant was engaged in the sale of automobile equipment including
pneumatic rubber tires. It was charged that he entered into a form of guarantee
agreement which constituted a violation of the state insurance laws. There were
two distinct forms available. One provided for a quarantee for a specific period
against road hazards that might render the tire unfit for further service. In
the event of such damage the defendant was to have the option of furnishing
a new tire or repairing the damaged one. The other printed form was a guarantee that the tire would wear for not less than a stated period, and that should
it fail to do so it would be repaired or replaced with a new tire.
It was contended that these guarantee agreements were made in violation of
Section 665 of the General Code: "No company, corporation, or association...
shall engage directly or indirectly in this state in the business of insurance or
enter into any contracts substantially amounting to insurance . .. unless it is
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expressly authorized by the laws of this state, and the laws regulating it and

applicable thereto, have been complied with."
On appeal, held, that the agreement was substantially an unconditional promise of indemnity and was therefore such an insurance contract as was governed
by the General Code. State ex rel. Duffy, Atty. Gen. v. Western Auto Supply Co.,
134 Ohio St. 163, 16 N.E. (2d) 256 (1938).
The history of the road hazard guarantee reveals a contest between mass
distributors marketing private brand tires, who favor the road hazard guarantee;
and tire manufacturers who are opposed to it. In the Tire Review, of November
1937, the following statement appeared, "The road hazard guarantee has been
under fire since it was originated by Standard Oil in 1931 for Atlas Tires.
During the hectic days of the N. I. R. A. manufacturers vigorously protested
the wide use of this type of guarantee for by that time most manufacturers
had adopted it as a defensive weapon. Manufacturers claim it has cost the industry fully $10,000,000 a year in unfair adjustments and has defeated sale of
perhaps millions of new tires." Since the decision in the instant case another
article was published in the Tire Review of July 1938, which expressed the reception of the decision as follows, "The road hazard tire guarantee, principal
weapon of mass distributors marketing private brand tires heard its death knell
tolled in Columbus, Ohio, July 13th, when the Ohio Supreme Court, in the
country's first test case of its kind upheld the Attorney General and the ruling
of the Ohio Superintendent of Insurance that the road hazard guarantee was
really tire performance insurance and that tire outlets, including filling stations
were not licensed to sell insurance. Tire manufacturers heralded the decision
as one of vital importance and declared that the fight would be waged now in
all states to have similar rulings." The contest as revealed in the above quoted
articles seems to have been effectively brought to a close by the decision in this
case which attached the "insurance" label to the road hazard guarantee.
In the instant case the court in considering the definition of insurance chose
one that defines insurance to be a contract of indemnity, namely, "A contract
to indemnify the insured against loss or damage to ceitain property named in
the policy, by reason of certain perils to which it may be exposed." State ex rel.
Sheets Atty. Gen. v. Pittsburgh C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 68 Ohio St. 9, 67 N.E.
93, 64 L.R.A. 405 (1903) ; State ex rel. Physicians' Defense Co. v. Laylin, 73 Ohio
St. 90, 76 N.E. 567 (1905).
Contracts of insurance are so completely matters of public interest that it is
within the police power of the state to regulate them State ex rel. United States
Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Sinith, 184 Wis. 309, 199 N.W. 954 (1924). The
power given to the legislature with respect to insurance regulation is admittedly
very broad. State ex rel. Time Ins. Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 455, 200 N.W. 651
(1924). The far reaching effect of insurance contracts upon the public is the
constitutional justification for their regulation. German Alliance Ins. Co. v.
Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612, 58 L.ed. 1011 (1914). It is not to be
doubted that the business of insurance is one of great public interest and that
broad regulatory power is necessary in order to protect public interest. The
theory of public interest has been based upon the fact that a large number of
persons contributing to a fund in the hands of a single person would be in
danger of losing their contributions if the solvency of that one person were not
protected and guarded.
The Ohio State Section 665 Gen. Code providing for insurance regulation
has placed any "contract substantially amounting to insurance" under the laws
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of the state regulating the business of insurance. It can readily be seen that
such provision puts teeth in the statute that will reach contracts not definitely or
actually insurance contracts, and it is on the basis of that provision that the
road hazard guarantee in the instant case is placed within the statute.
In construing, even so broad a statute, in a proper manner, the purpose and
justification for regulation of insurance should necessarily be kept in mind for
the court may not regulate a contract dependent upon a contingency if the essential element of public interest is not present. If a contract is made for a general
purpose other than insurance the mere fact that it contains an incidental provision under which an added benefit may accrue to one of the contracting parties
does not make it one of insurance and thereby subject it to regulation under
insurance statutes. Thus where a lessor of personal property agreed in the
lease to repair or replace the chattel in case of injury or damage by fire it was
held that the contract was not one of insurance. Re. Fire Certificate, 39 Pa. Co.
Ct. 163 (1911). And where one dealing in lightning rods, in order to induce
sales, entered a contract whereby he promised to pay all damage to the building
from being struck by lightning if his lightning rods were placed thereon it was
held not to be insurance. Cole v. Haven, 55 Iowa 741, 7 N.W. 383 (1880).
Similarly, in a case where a Bicycle Association upon receiving a certain yearly
membership fee contracted to clean the member's bicycle twice during the
year, repair tires or bicycle when damaged by accident and to replace it if
stolen unless found within a certain time, it was decided that such association
did not constitute an insurance company. Cont. ex rel. Hensely v. Provident
Bicycle Association, 178 Penn. 636, 36 AtI. 197 (1897). A dealer in auto lubricants
who agreed to replace broken auto gears of cars which used his lubricant was
held not to be operating as an insurance company. Evans & Tate v. Premier
Refining Co., 31 Ga. App. 303, 120 S.E. 553 (1923).
Certain plans which have been instituted to promote business have been
frowned upon by the insurance authorities. Among that group are those involving a conditional sale wherein it is promised that in the event of the death of
purchaser, the part of the debt remaining unpaid shall be cancelled and full and
complete title transfered immediately. Cases similar are those involving mortgages wherein the mortgage is cancelled upon the mortgagor's death. State v.
Beardsley, 88 Minn. 20, 92 N.W. 472 (1902) ; Equity Service Corp. v. Agull, 156
Misc. 552, 281 N.Y. Supp. 292 (1935).
The Ohio Court, in making its decision, drew a distinction between a warranty and an insurance contract, holding that a warranty promises indemnity
against defects in the article sold, while insurance indemnifies against loss or
damage resulting from perils outside of and unrelated to defects in the article
itself. In the principal case the defendant by undertaking to indemnify the customer against all road hazards in addition to guaranteeing the tire against
defects in material and workmanship, has converted the contract from one of
warranty to one that substantially amounts to insurance. If so stipulated, however, a warranty may cover future defects and events as well as present conditions. Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 654, 20 L.ed. 689 (1869) ; Brown v.
Nevins, 84 NJ.L. 215, 86 At. 938 (1913) ; Gay Oil Co. v. Roach, 93 Ark. 454,
125 S.W. 122, 137 Am. St. Rep. 95, 27 L.R.A. (N.s.) 914 (1910); Congar v.
Chamberlain, 14 Wis. 258, 13 L.R.A. 679 (1861). The parties may warrant as
regards to future conditions or performance if an intention to do so sufficiently
appears. Day v. Pool, 52 N.Y. 416 (1873).
Upon a request for an opinion as to whether or not the road hazard guarantee was insurance, the Attorney General of Oklahoma in an opinion dated May
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27, 1937 wrote, "The agreement made contemporaneous with and as a part of the
tire sale contract and without additional charge, is an agreement whereby the
seller represents and warrants to the purchaser that the tires being sold to
him are so constructed and free from defects as to be able to withstand during
the designated period wear and tear or injuries caused by blowouts, cuts bruises
or underinflation, same being the usual causes of tire trouble and that hence said
agreement is merely a warranty that the tires being sold are constructed and
free from defects, as aforesaid and not a contract of insurance." The Weekly
UnderwritersInsurance Dept. Service (1937) Oklahoma, p. 3.
After the decision in the instant case was handed down the Attorney General
of Nebraska was also asked to rule on the road hazard guarantee and in an
opinion dated August 30, 1938 he wrote in reviewing the decision, "While
this decision is informative it in no manner would control the Nebraska
department or court for the reason that its basis is a section of the Ohio Code.
Under the Nebraska statutes and decisions the business of insurance is impressed
with the public use and its regulation and supervision are authorized under the
broad police power of the state for the purpose of protecting the buying public.
The contracts considered in the opinion are warranties of merchandise either
as to quality or as to the length of time which they will serve the purpose for
which they were intended. Nothing is contained in the Insurance Code or in the
General Statutes which will warrant this Department in taking supervision over
purely commercial transactions in which certain warranties are made for the
purpose of inducing sales." The Weekly Under'writers Insurance Department
Service (1938) Nebraska, p. 11.
CHARLES D. O'BRIEN.

Limitation of Actions-Claim by Wife Against Husband-The defendants,
husband and wife, were married in 1916. The wife's father gave her $1,200 in
cash as a wedding gift which she loaned to her husband who agreed to pay it
back with interest. During the same year, the defendants began farming using
the $1,200 borrowed by the husband from the wife as part of the capital. The
defendants continued farming, and in 1930 the husband transferred all his
property to his father.
In March, 1936, the father conveyed to the husband certain livestock and
machinery and a one-half interest in other livestock and machinery. In May,
1936, the defendant-husband conveyed the property to the defendant-wife in
consideration of the $1,200 debt, which at that time with interest amounted to
$2,150, and the assumption by the wife of certain other debts owing by the
husband.
An action was begun in 1937 by three judgment-creditors of the defendanthusband to set aside the conveyance given by him to the defendant-wife. The
trial court set aside the conveyance, and the defendants appealed.
On appeal, held, judgment reversed and a new trial granted. The trial court
may have been of the view that the loan having been made by the defendant-wife
in 1916, and no precise time having been agreed upon for repayment, it was payable on demand, and therefore action upon the loan was barred by the statute
of limitations, and for that reason the debt was extinguished. In Wisconsin,
however, the statute of limitations does not run against a claim by a wife against
her husband. Campbell v. Mickelson, 227 Wis. 429, 279 N.W. 73 (1938).
The rule that the statute of limitations does not run against a claim of a
wife against her husband was judicially declared in 1891 by the Supreme Court

